Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Merger arbitrageurs generate returns by taking long and short positions in companies that are engaged in corporate mergers or acquisitions. Previous research has highlighted the positive risk adjusted returns and asymmetric risks of the strategy.
In this paper we create a simulated risk arbitrage portfolio, using UK data, and provide further evidence on the historical risk and return of the strategy.
Following the announcement of a merger there is typically a spread between the target company's share price and the deal price. The size of this spread reflects investor expectations of the corporate deal's success. Merger arbitrageurs attempt to profit by exploiting this spread. Deals can generally be classified into two main types, cash and share. With all share mergers, funds generally buy shares of the company being acquired and sell short the shares of the acquiring company in a proportion that reflects the proposed merger agreement. Whereas with cash mergers, the fund will buy the shares of the company being acquired below the agreed merger price and profit from the narrowing of the spread between the two when the deal is completed.
The merger arbitrage strategy has attracted attention due to the large returns earned by hedge funds following the strategy. CSFB/Tremont, a hedge fund advisory company, provides historical data on the returns of merger arbitrage hedge funds.
From January 1993 to March 2007 hedge funds following this strategy generated returns averaging 7.81% per annum, with an annual standard deviation of 4.1%.
This equates to a Sharpe ratio of 0.93, comparing favourably with a Sharpe ratio of 0.48 for the S&P500 over the time period.
1 Due to these high reported returns and evidence of biases in the hedge fund databases 2 , academic research on risk arbitrage has generally focused on replicating the strategy in the US market where the majority of merger activity takes place.
Early studies supported the profitability of the strategy. This was reflected by Dukes, Frohlich and Ma (1992) in their study of 761 American tender offers between 1971 and 1985. The authors found 82% of the transactions to be profitable with average abnormal returns of 24.6%. Jindra and Walkling (1999) annualised excess returns of 9.2% are reported. Outside the US market, Karolyi and Shannon (1999) examined the profit potential of a risk arbitrage trading strategy operating in the Canadian mergers and acquisitions market. They studied 37 deals valued over CAD$50million which took place in 1997, reporting an annualised excess return of 33.9%.
More recent research has highlighted three issues which may bias upwards prior performance estimates: annualisation of returns, transaction costs and asymmetric risk. Returns achieved on merger activity are short-term in nature i.e. one or two months from announcement to conclusion. Therefore it is inaccurate to assume these returns are sustainable for longer periods i.e. a year. It is this assumption upon which many of the exorbitant returns previously reported are based. The overestimation of They constructed positions for 1,901 cash and stock mergers and acquisitions for the aforementioned period. The authors constrained the risk bearing capacity which accounted somewhat for the practical limitations inherent in a risk arbitrage trading strategy. Returns ranging from 0.6% to 0.9% per month were observed for the sample period (annual return 7.2%-10.8%), with estimated positive abnormal returns of 3.6% per annum. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) , based on a comprehensive sample of 4,750 deals spanning from 1963 to 1998, found that a risk arbitrage portfolio, controlling for transaction costs, generated abnormal returns of 4% per annum. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) also provided evidence that the returns from risk arbitrage are asymmetrically related to equity market risk factors, and are akin to writing put options on a stock index.
The existing literature has generally focused on the North American markets for merger arbitrage, providing little evidence of the performance of the strategy in other markets.
3
These studies have also focused on assessing performance of monthly data. This may overlook some interesting features of higher frequency data. Finally, in the sample periods previously considered the market returns have been positive.
In this paper we address the issue of merger arbitrage risk and performance analysis in three ways. First, we construct a simulated merger arbitrage portfolio using high frequency daily data in a manner ascribed to practitioners. Second, in order to provide incremental evidence to the existing literature, we focus only on United
Kingdom listed stocks in the sample period January 2001 to December 2004 in which the UK stock market declined by 19%. Finally, we examine the data generating process of the merger arbitrage strategy to assess its risk.
To construct the simulated portfolio we take long positions in the target equity, combined with short positions in the acquirer's equity (in the case of all stock deals and stock/cash deals), creating merger arbitrage positions that capture deal spreads.
We then combine the merger arbitrage positions into three portfolios, an equally weighted portfolio, a value weighted portfolio and finally a real world portfolio which controls for transaction costs and capital constraints.
We focus on the UK over the period 2001 to 2004, as in this period the FTSE All Share Index declined by 19%. No prior study has focused exclusively on a sample period with negative cumulative equity market returns. Examining the strategy in such unfavourable market conditions provides useful evidence on the true market neutrality of the strategy. Prior evidence (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001 ) provides an expectation that merger arbitrage returns would be negative over this period.
Finally, by defining a set of asset classes that match an investment strategy's aims and returns, the portfolio's exposures to variations in the returns of the asset classes can be identified. Multi-factor asset class models have been specified extensively in the hedge fund and mutual fund literature to assess risk and performance of investment funds. The multi-factor methodology provides evidence on the market neutrality of the strategy. Following the identification of exposures, the effectiveness of the strategy can be compared with that of a passive investment in the asset mixes.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, to illustrate the strategy we describe two typical merger arbitrage transactions. In the third section we provide a thorough description of how our portfolio is constructed. A discussion of the statistical characteristics of the portfolios is given in the fourth section. The fifth section provides a discussion of the merger arbitrage risk factor models. In the sixth section we present results from estimating the risk factor models. The final section concludes the paper.
DESCRIPTION OF A TYPICAL MERGER ARBITRAGE POSITION
A greater understanding of the mechanics of a risk arbitrage investment may be gained from a closer look at two key transactions, a cash deal and a stock deal. Celltech's bid for OGS leads to a negative return on invested capital of -4.2%.
PORTFOLIO CONSTRUCTION
In this section we describe how the risk arbitrage portfolios are constructed. Stock price and interest rate data come from DataStream and all data on the merger terms are from Acquisitions Monthly.
The profitability of the strategy depends on the merger spread. Merger spreads are the platform upon which risk arbitrage returns are based.
"The speculation spread represents an immediately visible component of the total expected return endogenously determined through the actions of traders bidding in
the post-announcement period". (Jindra and Walkling, 2004 p. 498) Spreads observed for cash deals on the date of announcement are calculated using equation (1).
[
Where P i offer is the tender price for the i th offer and P i announce is the price observed on the announcement date for the i th offer. For successful deals the spread decreases consistently until the deal's conclusion, when it goes to zero. Seventy nine per cent of the total deal population included in the sample utilise cash when bidding for a target company. Thus the spreads reported below are representative of the broader sample. Table 1 also reports the deal duration. The duration is the length of time it takes a deal to complete from announcement to conclusion. The duration affects the risk arbitrageur through the opportunity cost of deals forgone when capital is tied up for prolonged periods. The average duration of all cash deals included in the sample is thirty seven trading days.
Insert Table 1 here
Merger spreads in the United Kingdom average 1.99% for the sample period. This reflects the large volume of activity evident in the merger arbitrage sector, as a number of investment banks and specialist hedge funds, with broad capital bases, now practise risk arbitrage trading strategies. The increased number of risk arbitrageurs has had a negative effect on returns, as risk arbitrageurs compete away their rent (Cornelli and Li, 2001 ).
Risk arbitrageurs derive returns from two sources where cash is used by an acquiring firm to purchase a target company. Primarily a long position is taken in the target company's stock and held until the deal is consummated. The aim is to achieve a return on the spread observed on the announcement date. A second source of return is from dividends received on the long position in the target stock. A dividend payment can have a large effect on daily portfolio returns. For the purposes of this study daily returns are calculated for individual deals using equation (2).
Where R it is the return for deal i on day t, P it T is the price of the target company i on day t, P it-1 T is the price of target company i on day t-1 and D it T is the dividend receivable for target company i on day t. When a deal is completed successfully the risk arbitrageur exchanges the long position held for the cash offered by the acquirer.
If an offer is unsuccessful the risk arbitrageur disposes of the long position at the prevailing market rate.
An arbitrageur's approach to a stock swap is more complex. Primarily the arbitrageur seeks to maximise returns on the spread observed between the acquirer's share price and the target's share price at the date of announcement. Thus the risk arbitrageur also engages in short selling of the acquirer's stock. The number of shares sold short by the risk arbitrageur is determined by the deal's share exchange ratio. Where applicable, dividends receivable from the long position are offset against dividends payable on the short position. Returns are calculated at the end of each day. Large, well established risk arbitrageurs receive interest on the proceeds of a short sale (generally at the risk free rate). Position returns in this study incorporate the return on the spread, the return on the proceeds of the short sale and any dividends receivable or payable and are calculated using equation (3).
Where, R it is the return for deal i on day t, P it T is the price of the target company i on day t, P it-1 T is the price of target company i on day t-1, D it T is the dividend receivable for target company i on day t, P it A is the price of the acquiring company i on day t,
A is the price of acquiring company i on day t-1, D it A is the dividend payable on the short position in acquiring company i on day t, rf represents the risk free rate, P A i1 is the price of the acquiring company on the first day the deal is announced, Δ symbolises the share exchange ratio and the Position Value t-1 represents the value of the overall position on the previous day and is calculated as
On successful conclusion of a deal, the risk arbitrageur repays the shareholder from whom the acquirer's stock was originally borrowed with the shares in the newly merged entity, originally purchased in the target firm.
If a deal concludes unsuccessfully the risk arbitrageur covers the short position in the acquirers stock at the prevailing market rate. The long position held in the target firm must also be sold at the prevailing market rate. This creates the potential for downside risk.
We construct equally weighted (EWRA), value weighted (VWRA) and real world The real world portfolio includes transaction costs, replicating the practicalities faced by active risk arbitrageurs. The transaction costs are reported in Table 2 .
Insert Table 2 here
Online share trading is utilised for investment and divestment purposes using an average price of £11.50 per unlimited trade. 4 In the United Kingdom the 'Panel for
Takeovers and Mergers' also imposes a £1 levy on all trades larger than £10,000.
The vast majority of transaction costs are incurred from government stamp duty imposed on investments made on the London Stock Exchange at a rate of 0.5%.
Considering the average investment is £70,904, the total stamp duty accrued over the four year period is sizeable (£42,543). Adhering to the realistic nature of this portfolio, the idle capital is assumed to earn the risk free rate each day.
Insert Table 3 here
The annual returns of the three portfolios are reported in Table 3 Table 4 , Panel A.
Insert Table 4 here
The RWRA portfolio generates a positive daily excess return of 0.009% for the sample period. The EWRA portfolio performs better, earning an excess daily return Table 4 also reports Ljunx-Box Q-Statistics testing for autocorrelation up to ten lags in each of the portfolios. Both the VWRA-Rf and EWRA-Rf series exhibit serial correlation.
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT MODELS
In this section of the paper we evaluate the risk adjusted performance of the risk arbitrage portfolios over the sample period with two asset pricing models, the market model derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) and a three factor model incorporating a market, size and value factors (Fama and French, 1992, 1993 ).
The market model is a single index model which assumes that all of a stock's systematic risk can be captured by one market factor. The equation to estimate this is (4).
Where R pt is the return on the merger arbitrage portfolio at time t in excess of the risk free rate, R M t is the excess return on the FTSE All Share for month t and ε t is the error term. The three factor stock model extends the market model through the inclusion of two factors which take the size and book to market ratio of firms into account. It is estimated from equation (5).
R M t , SMB t , HML t , ε t ~ IID (5)
Where SMB t is the factor mimicking portfolio for size (Small Minus Big) and HML t is the factor mimicking portfolio for book to market ratio (High Minus Low). We construct SMB as the return on the FTSE UK Small Companies Index -the return on the FTSE100 UK Index. HML is constructed as the return on the FTSE Value Index -the return on the FTSE Growth Index. All of the indices are value weighted.
Fama and French (1992, 1993 ) employ a similar model to explain the cross section of stock returns. Including these factors in our analysis allows us to control for risk, and as such, our analysis is based on abnormal (i.e. risk adjusted) return.
To formally test the portfolios for abnormal performance we examine the estimated intercept, α, of the market and three factor models. The intercept of the equation is commonly referred to as Jensen's alpha (Jensen, 1968) and is interpreted as a measure of out-or under-performance. To assess performance we examine the intercepts, sign and significance. The magnitude of the estimated alpha depends on the magnitude of the portfolio returns and the proportion of those returns unrelated to the market risk of the portfolio. A significantly positive alpha is evidence that the portfolio generates positive risk adjusted abnormal returns. A significantly negative alpha is evidence that the portfolio generates negative risk adjusted abnormal returns over the sample period, while an alpha insignificant from zero is evidence that after adjusting for risk, the portfolio generates no abnormal returns.
Descriptive statistics of the three risk factors and cross correlations are reported in Table 4 , Panel B and C respectively. The risk factors have mean returns which are zero or negative over the sample period. It is also notable that the variance of the risk factors is considerably higher than the variance of the risk arbitrage portfolios.
These factors also exhibit negative skewness and positive excess kurtosis. Q-Stats indicate the presence of serial correlation in each of the risk factor series. In Panel C there is high negative correlation between SMB and R M . This is due to the FTSE100
representing a large proportion of the market capitalisation of the FTSE All Share index.
RESULTS
In this section of the paper results are reported from estimating the models discussed in the previous section for the three simulated merger arbitrage portfolios. Table 5 reports results from OLS estimation of the risk factor models discussed above for the EWRA, VWRA and RWRA portfolios. Although the conditional heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are not formally treated in the OLS estimate of the parameters, the test statistics are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent due to Newey and West (1987) .
Insert Table 5 here None of the coefficients are significant from zero and the explanatory power of the estimated models is close to zero. Given the low variance of the EWRA and RWRA portfolios and the lack of covariance with the risk factors, both portfolios exhibit significantly positive α, indicating abnormal performance of 4 basis points per trading day for the EWRA portfolio and 1 basis point per day for the RWRA portfolio. This is equivalent to 10% per annum and 2.5% per annum abnormal returns respectively. Due to the larger variance and lower mean return, the VWRA α, though positive, is not significant from zero.
Robustness tests indicate that the results reported in Table 5 are not sensitive to (i) the choice of market index (we also estimated performance relative to the MSCI and DataStream UK indices with no difference in findings); (ii) the use of returns rather than excess returns; (iii) the use of monthly rather than daily data; and (iv) the assumption of no multicollinearity (We also estimate the model with the return on the FTSE Small Companies Index in place of SMB with no change in findings). To correct for the potential downward bias in beta estimation when using daily data, two lags of the daily return on each of the risk factors are specified in addition to the contemporaneous return when estimating equations (3) and (4). This downward bias is caused by non-synchronous trading between the illiquid stocks and the more liquid asset class factors.
Insert Table 6 here
Results from OLS estimation of models (4) and (5), incorporating lags of the risk factors, are reported in Table 6 . Although the magnitude of the coefficients is larger, none are significant from zero and the models again have almost zero explanatory power. Estimated α are larger for the EWRA (5 basis points) and RWRA portfolios (2 basis points) for the non-synchronous model. This equates to annualised abnormal returns of 12.5% and 5% per annum respectively.
Finally, to investigate if the risk arbitrage portfolios are linearly related to equity market risk factors, we estimate the non-synchronous trading models in two sub- Table 7 .
Insert Table 7 here 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we simulate portfolios in the manner ascribed to merger arbitrageurs.
We take long positions in the stocks of target companies and, depending on the terms of the merger, combine these long positions with short positions in the acquirer's equity. Over the sample period 2001 to 2004, when the FTSE Index returns were negative, this strategy produced consistently positive returns with a low variance. To ensure these results are robust to real world limitations, we construct one series with transaction costs and limitations on investing capital. We find evidence that the merger arbitrage portfolios exhibit abnormal returns and almost no significant relationship with equity market risk factors over the sample period.
Contrary to prior evidence, we also find no increase in systematic risk in depreciating equity markets.
We construct three portfolios: an equally weighted, value weighted and real world.
The equal weighted and value weighted portfolios have fewer constraints, and unsurprisingly the equal weighted portfolio generates the largest returns. Suggesting that larger deals may be more efficiently priced the value weighted portfolio exhibits the lowest returns. Finally the real world portfolio, which controls for transaction costs and capital constraints, while producing lower returns than a portfolio equally weighted amongst transactions, still generates abnormal risk adjusted returns of at least 2.5% per annum.
To assess the risk of the portfolios we specify two asset pricing models, the market model and a UK three factor model, incorporating size and value risk factors.
Results from estimating contemporaneous and lagged models, indicate that, contrary to the findings of prior literature, our portfolios exhibit almost no significant relationship with commonly specified equity risk factors.
In addition this finding is not dependent on the level of returns. We subdivide the sample into two time periods, a negative return stock market period from January over the initial period of the sample, equity returns were negative and in this period the merger arbitrage portfolios produced their largest returns.
The evidence presented in this paper on merger arbitrage performance and market neutrality has important implications for researchers and practitioners. However, one limitation of our research is the relatively short sample period. Future research could focus on replicating this study in the UK for an extended sample period
NOTES
1 See http://www.hedgeindex.com for details on the CSFB Tremont Indices.
2 Hedge fund databases exhibit several biases including survivor bias, lookback bias and selection bias. For details of these biases see for example Fung and Hsieh (1997) .
3 There are some studies examining merger arbitrage outside North America. For example, Hutson and Kearney (2005) model the interaction between bidder and target stock prices during takeover bids on the Australian stock market.
4 £11.50 is the average share trading cost from a sample of six UK online stockbrokers. 5 We specify the one month money market rate as the risk free rate.
6 Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) amongst others show that betas of securities that trade less (more) frequently than the index, used as the market proxy, are downward (upward) biased.
Results are not sensitive to the choice of lags. We repeat the analysis with 4 to 10 lags of the explanatory factors with no change in findings. This table presents annual return data for each of the risk arbitrage portfolios, the market represented by the FTSE All Share Index and the risk free rate. The first series (EWRA) is an equally weighted portfolio ignoring the practical limitations of arbitrage and averaged across daily returns. The second series (VWRA) is similar to the EWRA except for the target firm's market capitalisation figure is employed as a weighting factor. The third return series (RWRA) is comparative to an actively managed risk arbitrage portfolio and accounts for the practical limitations faced by risk arbitrageurs. CAR is the compounded annual rate of return. is an equally weighted portfolio ignoring the practical limitations of arbitrage and averaged across daily returns. The third series (VWRA-Rf) is similar to the EWRA except for the target firm's market capitalisation being employed as a weighting factor. The return series generated by the market (R MKT -Rf) for the sample period and the size (SMB) and book to market (HML) factors are also analysed. Panel B presents the correlation coefficients between the 3 explanatory factors. 
Date Total

Figure 1 Cumulative Returns
This graph plots the value of £1 million invested in each of the portfolios on the 1/1/2001 and divested on 31/12/2004. The first portfolio (EWRA) is an equally weighted portfolio ignoring the practical limitations of arbitrage and averaged across daily returns. The second portfolio is similar to the EWRA except for the target firm's market capital being employed as a weighting factor. The third portfolio (RWRA) is comparative to an actively managed risk arbitrage portfolio. Rf is the risk free rate. FTSE represent the FTSE All Share Index.
